Introduction and overview by Jackson, Natalie
Policy Quarterly – Volume 13, Supplementary Issue – June 2017 – Page 3
Natalie Jackson
Introduction  
and overview
Since its original formulation in the 1940s (Davis 1945; 
Notestein 1945), the phenomenon known as ‘the global 
demographic transition’ has been used to understand the 
trend of structural population ageing, and with it, the slowing 
and ultimately the ending of population growth – now 
anticipated globally around the end of the present century 
(Lutz, Sanderson & Sherbov 2004). However as originally 
conceptualised, the theory pertained to ‘closed’ populations, 
in which the only dynamics were births and deaths. Falling 
death rates cause populations to first become younger and to 
grow in size, while falling birth rates eventually cause them to 
become older, and growth to slow – the increased numbers of 
survivors at older ages becoming an increased proportion of 
the population (Coale 1972; Chesnais 1990). 
retirement and/or to be close to family, 
services and facilities (Champion 1992; 
Rogers & Raymer 2003). Older people 
moving out of an area slow its structural 
ageing, older people moving in accelerate 
it. Similarly, the movement of families 
affects the age structure across the 
childhood and reproductive ages – leavers 
cause populations to age, arrivals cause 
them to become younger.
The question, then, is to what extent 
overall migration is accelerating or 
ameliorating structural ageing, and with it 
hastening or slowing the theorized shift to 
the ending of population growth; and, 
does the situation unfold differently at 
national and subnational level?
We examine these questions in this 
Supplementary Issue of Policy Quarterly, 
with a focus on subnational New Zealand. 
Compared to other developed countries, 
New Zealand’s total fertility rate is 
relatively high – although having recently 
fallen below 2.0 it is now somewhat below 
the intergenerational replacement level of 
2.1 births per woman. There is also 
considerable international and domestic 
(internal) migration, per capita. 
Simultaneously, the national population 
aged 65+ years has continually increased, 
from 9 percent around 1976, to 12 percent 
in 2001 and almost 15 percent in 2016. At 
subnational level, that figure exceeds 20 
Increasingly, migration has made the 
progression of population ageing much 
more difficult to study, as the majority 
of those who move are at young adult/
reproductive age, and their leaving and 
arriving affects the age structures of the 
populations from which they left and to 
which they arrive (Bedford & Pool 2001; 
World Bank 2009; Dyson 2011). By and 
large, leavers of youthful ages cause the 
population to age; arrivals cause it to 
become younger. 
But there is also the growing trend of 
older people moving, typically for 
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percent in 41 percent of towns and 29 
percent of rural centres (see Jackson and 
Brabyn infra). However, rather than these 
differences reflecting either ultra-low 
birth rates or overly large subnational 
discrepancies in birth and death rates, 
they are primarily explained by differences 
in ‘age-selective’ migration, as indicated 
above. This age-selective migration is 
causing many areas to age far more rapidly 
than they would from demographic 
transition alone. They have the same 
outcome as advanced structural ageing, 
and therefore need appropriate policies, 
planning, resources and facilities, but they 
are ageing from a very different cause to 
that conventionally understood as the 
primary driver of structural ageing: low 
fertility. In this regard subnational New 
Zealand is following its Japanese, United 
States and European counterparts 
(Matanle & Rausch 2011; Johnson, Field 
& Poston 2015).
Because migration is not 
conventionally understood as a driver of 
structural ageing, there is a danger that 
affected areas will not see the timely policy 
development that is required: in New 
Zealand, policy development on advanced 
structural ageing is not yet on the agenda. 
We hasten to note that the ageing-driven 
end of national population growth and 
onset of national level depopulation is still 
well over the horizon in New Zealand. With 
one of the developed world’s highest birth 
rates and per capita international 
migration intakes, total New Zealand is 
assured of relative youth and growth for 
many years. However, reflecting 
international findings, our empirical 
evidence shows that the onset of 
depopulation begins sub-nationally, at 
different times, in different ways. For 
many of New Zealand’s depopulating 
areas, the trend has long been and 
currently remains the direct outcome of 
net migration loss – although in the 
majority of cases, that loss was reduced 
through natural increase (more births 
than deaths). Increasingly, however, 
subnational decline will be driven by a 
new set of dynamics: the onset of natural 
decrease, and in a more potent form, 
combining with net migration loss. 
Bucher and Mai (2005, cited in Matanle & 
Rausch 2011: 19-20, 46-47) propose that 
the trends represent a fundamental shift 
from what they refer to as the ‘old’ form of 
depopulation, where there was positive 
natural increase but it was insufficient to 
offset net migration loss, to this ‘new’ 
form, net migration loss and natural 
decrease in tandem, increasingly 
intractable, self-reinforcing, and, for many 
areas, permanent. 
Is youthful New Zealand following its older 
counterparts?
Faced with empirical evidence of 
widespread subnational depopulation in 
New Zealand across the period 1996 to 
2006, the six authors of this issue wished 
to know the extent to which subnational 
New Zealand might be following its 
international counterparts – and therefore, 
if there might be a tipping point which 
would provide early warning of the onset 
of national level depopulation. Moreover, 
if subnational New Zealand is following 
its international counterparts, while at 
the same time being relatively youthful 
and growing strongly at national level, are 
there broader theoretical implications? We 
noted that the mainstay of demographic 
theorising about population change 
and the ending of population growth – 
global demographic transition theory, 
as outlined above – pays scant attention 
to migration, while mobility transition 
theories that assist in understanding the 
migration movements of people pay 
equally little attention to demography 
(among the few exceptions are Zelinsky 
1971; Skeldon 1997; Bedford & Pool 2001; 
Dyson 2011). Specifically, as noted above, 
we argued that migration is by definition 
age- and sex-selective, and therefore alters 
the age and sex structure of both origin 
and host regions. If migration is in fact 
interacting with the structural ageing of 
some regions, and, in some cases, causing 
or accelerating that structural ageing, a 
study drawing the two together would 
provide a new basis for understanding 
contemporary and future population 
change, and potentially have the power to 
contribute to a theory of depopulation.
We felt that it was timely that such a 
study be done, as early reports on 
depopulation were overwhelmingly 
negative, such as: ‘… reduced local tax 
revenues and reductions in redistributed 
income from urban regions; obsolete public 
infrastructure and reduced investment in the 
rural economy; … abandonment of residential 
and business properties; decline in the quality 
of the built environment; and severe damage 
to the natural environment’ (Matanle & 
Raush 2011: 37-38; see also Haartsen & 
Venhorst 2010; Matanle 2014, 2017a). At the 
same time, the idea that depopulation will 
have many positive benefits is also beginning 
to emerge (Demeny 2009; Reher 2011), as is 
the concept of a possible ‘depopulation 
dividend’ (Matanle 2017a, 2017b). For these 
opportunities to be successfully converted to 
beneficial outcomes, it will be necessary to 
engage with them long before local councils 
and similar agencies are overwhelmed with 
depopulation that they had not been 
anticipating (Matanle & Sato 2010; Audirac 
2012; Martinez-Fernandez, Kubo, Noya & 
Weyman 2012; Jackson 2014; McMillan 
2016).
In 2014 we received funding from the 
Royal Society Marsden Foundation to 
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a study be done, as early reports on 
depopulation were overwhelmingly 
negative [due to the] decline in the 
quality of the built environment; 
and severe damage to the natural 
environment’
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examine ‘The subnational mechanisms of 
the ending of population growth. Towards a 
theory of depopulation’. We felt that its 
Mäori title, Tai Timu Tangata. Taihoa e? in 
English, ‘the ebbing of the human tide - 
what will it mean for the people?’ sustained 
our motivation for the three years of 
subsequent research, and have titled this 
issue accordingly. 
We report here on a selection of the 
project’s main findings, with additional 
analyses available from the reference lists 
accompanying each article. Each member 
of the research team worked on a different 
strand of the research, although in many 
cases they worked in pairs. 
The ‘when’, ‘how’ and ‘why’ of New 
Zealand’s new demographic regime
Ian Pool was the team’s historian and 
research advisor, guiding the project’s 
conceptual, theoretical and interpretive 
aspects. His article in this issue, ‘The 
when, how and why of New Zealand’s 
population and development path’, 
provides the backdrop to today’s spatial 
and demographic setting. In particular 
he asks whether urbanisation and 
‘rurbanisation’ (a form of peri-urban 
growth where previous rural functions 
have been replaced by lifestyle blocks, 
from which people may commute long 
distances into cities, through to retirement 
zones that may be relatively isolated) 
unfolding since the 1970s and 1980s, 
coupled with the longer-term trend to low 
fertility, are continuities – or accelerations 
– of past trends, or are period-bound, 
or represent a major demographic and 
social disjuncture that will see New 
Zealand’s population growth slow and 
eventually end, as elsewhere. He proposes 
that New Zealand may well have entered 
what has been termed elsewhere a ‘low 
fertility trap’, but one that is unfolding in 
New Zealand for contradictory reasons, 
and differs spatially. On the one hand, 
reflecting long-term migration patterns 
and trends, today’s rural areas have 
fewer young adults and children, and 
relatively old age structures. Peri-urban 
and ‘rurban’ settlements, similarly, are 
the destination of many more recent 
retirees, also resulting in fewer children. 
On the other hand, the majority of young 
adults and potential parents move to and 
live in or near the cities and large towns, 
but will paradoxically produce low birth 
numbers because of prolonged education, 
subsequent career-development, work-
family life imbalances and high housing 
costs. Partially offsetting these outcomes 
are the probably temporary effects of 
subnational ethnic differences in family 
formation and fertility (see Cochrane 
& Pool infra on the important role of 
Mäori reproduction in New Zealand’s 
development; also Cochrane & Maré 
infra). Drawing on Italy’s unsuccessful 
attempts to reverse ultra-low fertility 
trends in its southern Mezzogiorno, 
Pool suggests that even undocumented 
migrants attempting to enter the country 
are seeking a different life, and are 
more likely to adopt local demographic 
regimes than bolster declining birth 
numbers. Instead, he argues, today’s 
subnational population growth and 
decline differentials were foreshadowed 
years ago in the theory of total social 
production (Cordell, Gregory & Piché 
1994), which holds that people must both 
produce (on a daily basis) and reproduce 
(generationally) if populations are to 
survive. That the factors of production 
increasingly involve migration is leading 
us to a very different demographic regime 
(see Jackson and Pool forthcoming). 
Migration defined as a movement from 
one place to another includes commuting. 
This is not only a statistically significant 
phenomenon (Cochrane & Maré infra), 
but is a key factor in widely separating 
place of work from residence, a trend of 
increasing importance, the downstream 
effects of which include peri-urbanisation 
and even rurbanisation that are 
dramatically changing NZ’s population 
geography.
Ten key observations 
The second article in this issue, by Natalie 
Jackson and Lars Brabyn (Subnational 
mechanisms of population growth and 
decline 1976-2013), is really three inter-
related articles condensed into one 
compact story. The first paper expanded 
on Grimes and Tarrant (2013) to examine 
overall trends in population size for 143 
New Zealand towns and 132 rural centres, 
for the period 1976-2013 (Jackson, 
Brabyn & Maré 2016). It found similar 
clustering to Grimes and Tarrant, and 
in particular, the presence of ‘runaway’ 
growth and decline areas that had 
previously been similarly sized, at our 
baseline in 1976; however, our analysis 
went further to examine the extent to 
which growing and declining areas have 
been doing so because of natural increase 
and/or net migration. By and large, net 
migration loss was widespread across 
most years of the period, while natural 
increase was almost everywhere positive, 
resulting in the latter offsetting the former 
in the majority of cases, or alternatively, 
augmenting net migration gain. The 
second paper (Jackson et al, forthcoming) 
applied these data to a new framework – 
developed as part of the project – which 
explicitly recognizes three interactions 
between natural increase and net 
migration that result in growth, and three 
that result in decline. These interactions 
showed clearly the role of natural increase 
in offsetting past net migration loss, 
while projections at territorial authority 
area (TA) level ‘extended’ the analysis 
to show that natural decrease will soon 
become much more widespread, leaving 
towns and rural centres declining from 
net migration, increasingly ‘unprotected’. 
That paper also showed that subnational 
... the vast majority of New Zealand 
towns, rural centres and territorial 
authority areas are somewhat older as a 
result of migration – rather than younger 
as many would expect.
Page 6 – Policy Quarterly – Volume 13, Supplementary Issue – June 2017
New Zealand’s shift to natural decrease 
thus far has been more strongly related 
to the proportion of women aged 15-44 
years in each jurisdiction, and thus to 
net migration loss at those ages, than to 
the conventional harbinger of natural 
decrease, very low fertility. The third 
paper explored the related issue of ‘age-
selective migration’, developing further 
indices for analysing the extent to which 
net out-migration at younger ages 
and net in-migration at older ages are 
accelerating structural ageing (Jackson & 
Brabyn forthcoming). Using experimental 
modelling, the analysis was further able to 
distinguish between population change 
‘with’ and ‘without’ migration, finding 
for example, that the vast majority of 
New Zealand towns, rural centres and 
territorial authority areas are somewhat 
older as a result of migration – rather than 
younger as many would expect. In order 
to summarise these findings, the article in 
this issue is structured around a set of ten 
key observations. 
Ma-ori in contemporary and future 
development
Also drawing attention to the all-
important role of natural increase, the 
article by Bill Cochrane and Ian Pool 
(Mäori in New Zealand’s contemporary 
development) focuses attention on the 
contribution of Mäori reproduction to 
New Zealand’s population growth, and 
to its economic development in terms of 
subsequent share of the working age, and 
employed, population. With a substantially 
younger age structure than that of the 
total population, especially that of the 
Päkehä (European-origin) population, 
the slightly higher fertility rates of Mäori, 
combined with childbearing at younger 
ages than non-Mäori, have resulted in 
the number of births that are identified 
as Mäori making an ever-increasing 
contribution to overall birth numbers. 
With a time-lag, their sequel is increasing 
numbers in the working age population, 
which have played an increasing role in 
ensuring labour supply, most importantly 
in some low growth regions. Indeed, this 
contribution differs markedly by region, 
which in many cases is synonymous with 
iwi. Cochrane and Pool use the Northland 
and Gisborne-Hawke’s Bay regions to 
illustrate the case. Between 1976 and 1996 
the Mäori share of the total population 
in each region rose markedly, before 
stabilizing at around twice the national 
share. In 2013, Mäori in the Northland 
Region accounted for 55 percent of the 
region’s 0-4 year olds, up from 28 percent 
in 1976; in the Gisborne-Hawke’s Bay 
region the proportions were 67 and 21 
percent respectively. By comparison, the 
Mäori proportion of the 0-4 year-old 
population at national level increased 
from just 13 to 27 percent – although in 
each case this is also somewhat greater 
than the total Mäori share. Similarly, the 
proportion of Mäori in the working age 
population in both regions increased from 
around 18 percent in 1986 to close to 30 
percent in 2013, by comparison with their 
national level counterparts increasing 
from 10 to 13 percent, roughly equal to 
their population share. Sadly, as Cochrane 
and Pool show, these substantially greater 
proportions at working age have not 
resulted in greater employment rates for 
Mäori, depriving both Mäori and all of 
New Zealand of a potential ‘collateral’ 
economic dividend – the potential of 
the more youthfully abundant Mäori 
population to disproportionately replace 
older Päkehä reaching ‘retirement age’. 
The policy implications of this situation 
are clear. Today’s young Mäori (and 
Pasifika) will play an increasing role in 
determining New Zealand’s economic 
future, and far greater attention to their 
education, training, health and wellbeing 
needs is an imperative. 
Looking back – migration and the role of 
amenities
Lars Brabyn’s article, ‘Declining towns 
and rapidly growing cities in New Zealand 
– developing an empirically based model 
that can inform policy’, returns our focus 
to the role of migration in determining 
the relative ‘fortunes’ of New Zealand’s 
regions, or more specifically of the 275 
towns and rural centres referred to above. 
Linking migration by age data from the 
Jackson and Brabyn database (above) with 
a comprehensive time-series database 
containing social, economic and natural 
amenity data, Brabyn employs a range of 
analytical techniques and modelling to 
explore why some towns grow and others 
don’t. He finds that age is a particularly 
important factor in determining which 
variables have the most influence. Younger 
people, especially around labour market 
entry age, are moving to more populated 
places and close to tertiary education 
facilities and, by implication, to jobs, while 
people approaching ‘retirement age’ have 
a preference for lifestyle drivers, such as 
warm temperatures and coastal towns, as 
well as access to international airports and 
tertiary hospitals. Although some of these 
drivers have been documented before, 
much understanding has been based on 
anecdotal evidence and weighted towards 
traditional drivers of employment and 
essential services. Brabyn’s research has 
substantiated this anecdotal evidence, but 
also demonstrated that lifestyle choice, 
both nature-based (mountains, climate 
and water views) and possibly cultural 
(access to large cities) are just as influential 
as employment drivers and access to 
essential services. Importantly for policy 
purposes, towns close to airports and 
with natural amenity value are especially 
favoured by those at labour-market exit 
age. With population ageing this group’s 
Today’s young Ma-ori (and Pasifika) will 
play an increasing role in determining 
New Zealand’s economic future, and 
far greater attention to their education, 
training, health and wellbeing needs  
is an imperative. 
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size will increase and there is likely to be 
increased movement of people to these 
towns – potentially ameliorating some of 
the projected declines for those towns. As 
he argues, knowing what characteristics 
are favourable, declining towns can 
examine how they can better capitalise on 
these factors. 
Looking ahead – migration and (un)certainty
Assisting us to look further ahead and to 
do so with an increased level of confidence, 
Michael Cameron’s article presents key 
findings from one of New Zealand’s first 
full sets of TA-level stochastic population 
projections, developed during the course 
of this project. By comparison with 
deterministic projections (the classic 
‘high’, ‘medium’ and ‘low’ variants that 
users of population projections are 
familiar with), the stochastic approach 
involves running a projection model a 
large number of times – in this case, 1,000 
times. On each run, the fertility, mortality 
and migration assumptions are randomly 
applied, in the process generating both 
future size and accompanying levels 
of (un)certainty. Cameron’s model 
also uniquely uses a ‘gravity’ model of 
migration – one which allows migration 
flows in each direction to be made 
explicit, and which will assist end users 
of these data to understand a little more 
about where their migrants come from 
and go to. For this issue, Cameron has 
used the model to explore the probability 
of TAs declining across the periods 2023-
2033 and 2043-2053 (see also Jackson & 
Cameron 2017). The progression from 
growth to decline is clearly charted for a 
number of TAs (and for a few, continued 
decline) as time passes, particularly for 
rural and peripheral areas. Between 2023 
and 2033, 20 TAs (30 percent) have a 90 
percent or greater chance of declining, 
increasing to 26 TAs (39 percent) between 
2043 and 2053. Less likely to decline, but 
still having a probability of decline of 
between 50 and 90 percent, are a further 
six TAs between 2023 and 2033, increasing 
to seven between 2043 and 2053. At the 
lowest end of the scale are five TAs with 
a probability of decline between 2033 
and 2043 of between 5 and 50 percent, 
increasing to seven TAs between 2043 
and 2053. These findings refine, but 
generally accord with, the medium 
variant deterministic projections used by 
Jackson and Brabyn (this issue) to extend 
their analysis of towns and rural centres. 
They also strengthen the proposition that 
New Zealand is facing a very different set 
of growth and decline dynamics to those 
extant in the past.
Looking ahead, looking back – the role of 
urban influence
Cochrane and Maré’s article, ‘Population 
change and urban influence’, concludes 
the issue by looking at the relationship 
between the degree of urban influence 
and population change – and at the 
possibility that commuting may partially 
resolve some of the issues outlined herein. 
The article itself sits within the tradition 
of conceiving of urban-rural relationship 
in terms of an urban core/rural periphery 
and seeks to find evidence of backwash 
(negative) or spread (positive) effects 
using a descriptive approach based on 
the Statistics New Zealand experimental 
urban-rural classification and census data 
for the 2001 and 2013 census years. This 
classification schema classifies areas on 
the basis of their level of urban influence 
where influence is determined by travel to 
work commuting. A number of variables 
are considered: population distribution 
and growth, age, ethnicity, employment 
rate, level and growth of skilled 
employment, and place of residence 5 
years ago. Starting with the distribution of 
the population they confirm that although 
population is strongly concentrated in 
urban areas, the most rapidly growing 
areas are those outside the urban areas 
which are subject to high levels of urban 
influence. This relationship between 
population growth and urban influence 
attenuates as the level of urban influence 
declines. Turning to the characteristics of 
these high growth/high urban influence 
areas, in these areas the fastest growing 
age group is that aged 65 years and over, 
with the next fastest growing being those 
aged 45-64 years. A summary measure 
based on area rankings of Population 
Growth (2001-2013), Employment 
Rate (2001), Percent Employed in High 
Skill Jobs (2001) and Percent Growth in 
High Skilled Jobs (2001-13) indicates 
that areas subject to high levels of urban 
influence are the best performing group, 
being the highest ranked on three of the 
outcome variables (population growth, 
employment rate and growth in high 
skilled jobs) and second on employment 
in high skill jobs. Further, for the other 
non-urban areas performance declines 
with the degree of urban influence, that 
is, high > moderate > low > rural/remote 
corresponding to a clear pattern of level of 
urban influence equating to the ranking 
of the area. The overall finding is that, 
on the basis of the descriptive evidence 
considered, areas of high urban influence 
benefit from their close connection with 
urban areas and that some areas can 
improve their growth performance by 
developing or strengthening their ties 
with urban areas.
What have we learned, what do we need to 
do? 
In this issue we have outlined a selection of 
the findings from just one project in one 
small country. We have argued that the 
ending of population growth and onset of 
depopulation is ‘over the horizon’ for New 
Zealand, at national level. However we 
have also shown that the majority of New 
Zealand’s subnational areas are ageing 
at a faster rate than might be otherwise 
appreciated in a country with a relatively 
high birth-rates and typically high levels 
of international migration; and that 
... we argue that areas losing young 
migrants simultaneously lose their 
replacement capacity to areas gaining 
them ... 
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migration, international and internal 
combined, has in many cases caused this 
accelerated ageing. We have shown that 
people are moving for different reasons 
than in the past, and that these movements 
are highly differentiated by age. Migration 
has also caused many areas to grow but to 
be smaller than they would have been in 
the absence of migration, their growth due 
to natural increase offsetting underlying 
net migration loss. We have shown the 
important role of Mäori in contributing 
to population growth and maintaining 
natural increase well in excess of their 
national population share in some areas; 
but we have also shown that natural 
increase per se is now becoming vulnerable, 
and projected to become natural decrease 
in an increasing proportion of TAs (and 
the towns and rural centres that comprise 
them), as the increased numbers at older 
ages result in an increase in the number of 
deaths, and as fewer people have children. 
This shift may be especially hastened if 
industrial closures continue to ravage and 
displace populations in which Mäori are 
present in disproportionate numbers. We 
have developed confidence levels around 
a new set of projections, which confirm 
that subnational New Zealand will soon 
see a different set of growth and decline 
dynamics than in the past. Increasingly, 
population growth will become 
concentrated in fewer TAs, towns and 
rural centres. We have shown that work-
related commuting is likely to sustain 
some areas for longer, particularly those 
near relatively large centres. 
Not included in this collection, our 
research has also led us to propose that all 
areas – sub-nationally, nationally, and 
internationally, face diminishing 
replacement capacity: the capacity of 
births to offset a) the increased numbers 
of deaths arising from increased numbers 
at older ages, and b) any net migration 
loss, as a result of interactions between the 
demographic transition and the mobility 
transition (Jackson & Pool forthcoming). 
Specifically, we argue that areas losing 
young migrants simultaneously lose their 
replacement capacity to areas gaining 
them, in effect ‘watering the neighbour’s 
garden’ (Attané & Guimoto 2007) and 
indicating the need for compensatory-
type policy development. 
As we note, all of this can occur while 
population growth continues at national 
level, and for New Zealand we expect this 
to be the case until somewhat later this 
century. At the same time, the subnational 
ending of growth and likely onset of 
sustained depopulation has not yet been 
theorized, and certainly not 
operationalised, to assist policy responses. 
As Matanle (2017a, 2017b) proposes, 
there are many plausible opportunities on 
offer under the auspices of a ‘depopulation 
dividend’, among them new economic 
innovations, less environmental damage, 
a renewed sense of community, and 
greater collaboration. However, similar to 
its classic ‘cousin’, the ‘demographic 
dividend’ (Bloom, Canning & Sevilla 
2003; Pool 2007), the depopulation 
dividend must be engaged with in a timely 
manner. With the demographic dividend, 
there is a short-term window of 
opportunity during which proactive 
policies to ensure the health and education 
of the future labour force must be 
developed and implemented. With the 
depopulation dividend, the window of 
opportunity is also short-term, as, if left to 
‘the market’, depopulating areas will 
wither and die. 
Pre-empting the emergence of such 
policy development, we supervised, as 
part of this project, a Masters student to 
undertake an evaluation of policy 
responses to depopulation across seven 
OECD countries (McMillan 2015). Too 
detailed to cover here, Rachael’s invaluable 
work is summarized in McMillan (2016). 
In sum, she categorized a vast array of 
policy responses as either a) ‘do nothing’ 
(ignore the problem and let the market 
decide), b) ‘counter’ (continue to seek 
economic and population growth by 
increasing the competitiveness of regions 
or key agencies), and c) ‘accept and adapt’ 
(continue to seek out opportunities which 
maximise economic and population 
growth, while adapting both them and 
policy development to the acceptance of 
low/zero/negative population growth). 
We note that this work has recently been 
picked up by the Maxim Institute and a 
set of recommendations developed, 
prioritizing the ‘accept and adapt’ model 
for regions facing the end of growth 
(Wood 2017: 31). Rather than repeat the 
exercise we conclude this introduction by 
endorsing that recommendation, with the 
added caveat that adaptation involves 
fully understanding the local dynamics, 
such as we have outlined in this issue, and 
orienting solutions towards them. 
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